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Abstract. This paper studies the outcome of a two-stage global game wherein a
market-based asset price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous
public signal about the fundamental that a¤ects tradersdecisions in the coordination stage
of the game. The microstructure of the trading stage is one in which informed traders may
place market orders rather than full demand schedules and where a competitive market-
making sector sets the price. Because market-order traders face price execution risk, they trade
less aggressively on their private information than demand-schedule traders, which slows down
information aggregation and limits the informativeness of the asset price. When all traders
place market orders, the precision of the price signal is bounded above and the outcome of the
coordination stage is unique as the noise in the private signals vanishes. More generally, in an
asset market with both market-order and demand-schedule traders, the presence of the former
may drastically limit the range of parameters leading to multiple equilibria. This is especially
true when traders optimise over their type of order, in which case market-order traders tend to
overwhelm the market when the precision of the private signal is large.
Keywords: Market microstructure; Information aggregation; Global game.
JEL Codes: C72, D82, G14.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study the outcome of a two-stage global game wherein a market-based asset
price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal about the
fundamental that a¤ects tradersdecision in the coordination stage of the game. Our motivation
for doing so is to examine the concern, rst raised by Atkeson (2001) and then made formal
by Angeletos and Werning (2006), that a publicly observed market price may aggregate dispersed
information so e¤ectively as to crowd out private signals in tradersassessment of the fundamental,
and in so doing facilitate their coordination on a self-fullling outcome. As illustrated by Angeletos
and Werning (2006), this may precisely occur as the noise in the private signal vanishes, a result
that directly challenges Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998)s argument
that a small perturbation of the full-information game restores equilibrium uniqueness.
The possibility that a small amount of private noise lead to multiplicity rather than uniqueness
of equilibrium outcomes arises when the precision of the endogenous public signal grows faster than
that of the underlying exogenous private signals at high levels of precision.1 In what follows we
Edouard Challe acknowledges the support of chaire FDIR.
yCNRS, Ecole Polytechnique and CREST; Email: edouard.challe@gmail.com.
zCREST; Email: edouard.chretien.2008@polytechnique.org.
1See also Hellwig et al. (2006). Hellwig (2002) emphasised the role of the relative precison of public versus private
information in determining the outcome of the game. Angeletos et al. (2006) study global games wherein endogenous
public information comes from policy choices rather than an asset price.
1
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show that this property crucially depends on the type of market microstructure that one assumes
at the trading stage of the game, and what this microstructure implies for the amount of private
information that is aggregated into the asset price. We substantiate this point by considering
a market microstructure for the trading stage wherein informed traders may place either full
demand schedules or more basic market orders, i.e., order to sell or buy a xed quantity of assets
unconditional on the execution price.2 All orders (from informed and noise traders) are then
aggregated into an asset price by a competitive market-making sector. This price provides the
endogenous public signal that informed traders may use to coordinate a speculative attack in the
second stage of the game.
To summarise, our results are as follows. In a pure market-order market (see Vives, 1995),
the precision of the endogneous public signal provided by the asset price is bounded above, even
when the precision of the underlying private signals is very (arbitrarily) large. This is due to the
competition of two forces. On the one hand, greater precision leads informed traders to trade more
aggressively on their private information by opening the possiblity of reaping large payo¤s from
trading. On the other hand, this very aggressiveness renders the asset price very volatile ex post
(after all market orders have irreversibly been aggregated), which raises the conditional volatility
of the net payo¤, i.e., the terminal dividend minus the trading price of the asset. The rst e¤ect
makes the informativeness of the price an increasing function of the precision of private signals.
The second e¤ect, however, runs counter the rst e¤ect: it deters market-order traders, which are
exposed to price execution risk, from placing large orders. As the precision of private information
increases the strength of the second e¤ect gradually catches up with that of the rst e¤ect and the
precision of the price signal increases more and more slowly. This boundedness of the information
conveyed by the price overturns the result in Angeletos and Werning (2006), because (endogenous)
public information can no longer crowd out (exogenous) private information in tradersBayesian
learning of the fundamental. As a consequence, a high level of precision of private information can
again uniquely pin down the outcome of the coordination game and we are back to Morris and
Shin (1998). When the share of market-order traders is still exogenous but not necessarily equal
to one, our result must be qualied in the following sense. While it is again true that as private
information becomes innitely precise then so does public information, just as in the pure demand
schedule/Walrasian auctioneer case of Angeletos and Werning (2006), it is nevertheless the case
that for large range degrees of precision the uniqueness region can be greatly expanded relative to
pure demand schedule case.
We nally examine the case where informed traders can choose their order type ex ante, where
the tradeo¤ is between placing expensive demand schedules or cheap market orders.3 We notably
study the impact of this choice on the equilibrium share of market-order traders and, by way of
consequence, on the outcome of the coordination stage. We show that as private noise vanishes
2See Brown and Zhang (1997), Wald and Horrigan (2005) and Vives (2008) for further disscussion of the impor-
tance of market orders in actual asset markets. In Challe and Chrétien (2015) we study a market microstructure
with a more general information structure than that in the present paper (by considering correlation of private noise
across traders, which signicantly complicates traders Bayesian learning), but we do not look at the implications of
market orders for the outcome of a coordination game.
3 In as much as demand schedules allow full conditionality of trades on the realised trading price, they are much
more (in fact, innitely more) complex that market orders (which are not conditional on the price). Therefore,
demand schedules should be more expensive, as we assume them to be.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events.
the equilibrium is always interior (i.e., market-order and demand-schedule traders are both in
positive measure), but market-order traders ultimately overwhelm the market (i.e., their measure
tends to one). As a result, the rate of convergence of the precision of the public signal under
endogenous order type is half that under exogenous order types. This implies that the endogenous
adjustment of the share of market-order traders further reduces the multiplicity region as private
noise decreases, relative to the case where this share is exogenous.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents two stages of the game. Section
3 analyses the outcome of the game when the shares of market-order and demand-schedule traders
are exogenous. Section 4 studies the endogenous determination of those shares, and how this a¤ects
the size of the multiplicity versus uniqueness regions. Section 5 concludes the paper. All the proofs
appear in the Appendix.
2. The model
Following Angeletos and Werning (2006), we consider a two-stage global game wherein a contin-
uum of informed traders i 2 I = [0; 1] trade an asset in a trading stage before deciding whether
to attack the regime in the coordination stage see Figure 1. Before the game starts, an unob-
served fundamental  is drawn from the distribution N  ;  1  (which is also the common prior
of informed traders) and a¤ects both asset payo¤s in the trading stage and the ability of the gov-
ernment to withstand a speculative attack in the coordination stage. Every informed trader gets
two noisy signals about : an exogenous private signal xi = +
 1=2
x i, with x > 0; i  N (0; 1)
and cov (; ) = cov
 
i; j 6=i

= 0, and a public signal z =  +  1=2z ~", with ~"  N (0; 1) and
cov (~"; ) = cov (~"; ) = 0. This public signal is taken as given by informed traders in the coordi-
nation stage but is endogenously determined in the trading stage of the game.
2.1. Coordination stage. In the coordination stage informed trader i chooses action ai 2
f0; 1g, with ai = 1 (= 0) if the trader is attacking (not attacking) the regime.4 The mass of
attacking traders is thus A =
R 1
0 aidi, and it is assumed that the regime collapses whenever
4This section parallels Angeletos and Werning (2006), except for the fact that we consider a nondi¤use prior, as
is required for the asset demands of market-order traders to be well dened. For the sake of comparability we keep
the same notations as theirs whenever this is possible.
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A > . Trader is payo¤ at that stage is U (ai; A; ) = ai (1A>   c), where c 2 (0; 1) is the
cost of attacking the regime. Hence, the payo¤ for a trader who successfully (unsuccessfully)
attacks the regime is 1   c > 0 ( c < 0), while one who does not attack earns 0 for sure. In
equilibrium A only depends on the aggregates (; z), i.e., A = A (; z). Trader is policy function
is a (xi; z) = arg maxa2f0;1g E [U (a;A(; z); ) jxi; z ], with A (; z) =
R
R a (xi; z) f (xij )dxi, where
f (xj ) is the density of xj  ( N (;  1x )).
We can restrict our attention to monotone equilibria, in which informed trader i chooses ai = 1
(i.e., to attack) if and only if xi < x (z) (i.e., the trader is su¢ ciently pessimistic about ; given
(xi; z)), where x (z) is a strategy threshold common to all traders, to be determined as part
of the equilibrium.5 In such equilibria the mass of traders attacking the regime is A (; z) =
Pr (xi < x
 (z)j ) =   px (x (z)  ), where  (:) is the c.d.f. of the standard normal. The
regime is abandoned whenever A (; z) > , or equivalently whenever  <  (z), where  (z) solves
 (
p
x (x
 (z)   (z))) =  (z) : (1)
It directly follows from the properties of  (:) that the latter equation has a unique solution
 (z) 2 (0; 1) for all x (z) 2 R, and that  (z) is continuous and strictly increasing in x (z).
This has the following interpretation. The threshold x (z) summarises tradersaggressiveness, in
that for any (; z) a greater value of x (z) increases the attacking mass A.  (z) represents the
regimes fragility, in that for any z a greater value of  (z) widens the range of realisations of 
leading to the regimes collapse. Hence equation (1) summarises the way in which a greater level
of aggressiveness on the part of traders raises the fragility of the regime.
Since the regime collapses if and only if    (z), trader is expected payo¤ from attacking
the regime is Pr (   (z)jxi; z)   c. In monotone equilibrium the threshold x (z) corresponds
to the signal received by the marginal trader (i.e. that indi¤erent between attacking or not) and
hence must satisfy Pr (   (z)jx (z) ; z) = c. Given the assumed information structure, j z; x
is normally distributed with variance  1  (x + z + ) 1 and mean  1
 
xx+ zz + 

.
Hence, indi¤erence of the marginal trader requires:

p
x + z + 

xx
 (z) + zz + 
x + z + 
   (z)

= 1  c (2)
The latter equality implicitly denes tradersaggressiveness x (z) 2 R as a continuous, strictly
increasing function of the regimesfragility  (z) 2 (0; 1) i.e., a fragile regime makes it safer to
bet on its collapse, thereby inducing a rightward shift in x (z). Solving both (1) and (2) for x (z)
and equating the two gives the equation G () =   (z), where
G ()   1 ()  z + p
x
;   (z) =
r
1 +
z + 
x
 1 (1  c)  p
x
   zp
x
z;
so we have (z) 2 G 1( (z)). When G : (0; 1) ! R is monotonically increasing, it necessarily
crosses the   (z) line exactly once whatever the value of z. When G (:) is non-monotonic there are
values of z such that G (:) crosses the   (z) more than once. It then follows from the minimal value
5See, e.g., Morris and Shin (2004, Lemma 1).
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of @G=@ that there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all z 2 R if and only if:
p
2x  z + : (3)
2.2. Trading stage. Let us now turn to the trading stage, which will determine both the
distribution (ex ante) and the realisation (ex post) of the public signal z. We assume that informed
traders have access to two assets: (i) a riskless bond in perfectly elastic supply and paying out a
constant interest rate; and (ii) a risky asset with trading price p and payo¤ . Aside from informed
traders, noise traders place a net asset demand for the risky asset of "  N  0;  1" . Following
Vives (1995) and Medrano (1996), we consider a market microstructure wherein (a) all or some
traders place market orders (rather than full demand schedules), and (b) a (competitive, risk-
neutral) market-making sector sets the price p. In contrast to a demand schedule, a market order
is conditional on the private signal xi but not on the execution price p; once placed, it is executed
irrevocably at whatever value of p is set by market makers. The market-making sector observes
the order book L (:) emanating from informed and noise traders and sets the price p; competition
among risk-neutral market makers then causes them to undercut each other until p = E (jL (:)).
Note that L (:) is itself a function of p whenever a positive mass of informed traders places demand
schedules.
Let us call M  I the set of market-order traders and InM the complementary set of demand-
schedules traders, and dene  =
R
InMdi 2 [0; 1] and 1   as the measures of those sets. In what
follows we will consider both the case whereM and InM are exogenous (Section 3) and that where
they are endogenous (Section 4). All informed traders have zero initial wealth (this is without
loss of generality) and preferences V (wi; i) =  e iwi , where i and wi = (   p) ki are the risk
aversion coe¢ cient and end-of-stage wealth of trader i, respectively. Private signals are assumed
to be independent of risk tolerance, i.e.,
8J  I,
Z
J
(i=i) di = 0:
An equilibrium of the trading stage is a pair of investment functions for demand-schedule
(kInM (xi; p; i)) and market-order (kM (xi; i)) traders and a price function p (; ") such that:
 kInM (:) and kM (:) maximise tradersexpected utility:
8i 2 InM; kInM (xi; p; i) 2 arg max
k2R
E[V ((   p)k; i)jxi; p]; (4)
8i 2M; kM (xi; i) 2 arg max
k2R
E[V ((   p)k; i)jxi]; (5)
 The market-making sector sets p = E[jL(:)], where
L (p) =
Z
InM
kInM (xi; p; i)di+
Z
M
kM (xi; i)di+ ": (6)
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The trading stage has a unique linear Bayesian equilibrium, which is characterised by:
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 the investment functions
kInM (xi; p; i) =
x
i
(xi p); kM (xi; i) =

i
(xi ); with  = 1
 1x +  1   ( +B2") 1
;
 the price function
p (; ") = (1  B)  + B   +B 1" ; with  = B"
B2" + 
: (7)
In those functions B > 0 is the unique real solution to the cubic equation:
B = x

InM
+
1  
M

1
x
+
1

  1
 + "B2
 1
; (8)
where  1InM and 
 1
M are the average risk tolerance coe¢ cients of demand-schedule and market-
order traders:
 1InM =
1

Z
InM
 1i di; 
 1
M =
1
1  
Z
M
 1i di:
Equation (7) implies that observing p is equivalent to observing +B 1". Thus, the endogenous
public signal z about  is z =  + B 1" (i.e., ~" = B 1") and has precision z = B2". We then
infer from (3) that equilibrium uniqueness in the coordination stage requires
p
2x  B2" + : (9)
Note that when  ! 0 (i.e., the prior is di¤use),  = 1 and i =  8i 2 [0; 1] (i.e., all
informed traders share the same preferences and place demand schedules), then equation (8) gives
B =  1x, so that p =  + 2x". Condition (9) then becomes
p
2x   22x", which is
identical to that in Angeletos and Werning (2006).
3. Exogenous trader types
3.1. Markets with a single type. We rst consider the case where all informed traders place
market orders in the trading stage (as in Vives, 1995) and that where they all place full demand
schedules. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If all informed traders place market orders in the trading stage, then the outcome
of the coordination stage is unique as x ! +1. If all informed traders place demand schedules,
then are multiple equilibrium outcomes in the coordination stage as x ! +1.
Proposition 1 implies that when the market microstructure of the trading stage is such that
traders place market orders and market makers set the price, then one recovers the original property
in Morris and Shin (1998), according to which the outcome of the coordination stage is unique
as the noise in the private signal vanishes. In contrast, in a pure demand-schedule market one
recovers the basic result in Angeletos and Werning (2006), in which a Walrasian auctioneer (rather
than a market-making sector) sets the price. The intuition for this di¤erence is as follows. In a
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pure demand-schedule market ( = 1), informed traders are able to condition their trades on the
trading price, so the only source of risk they face concerns the true value of the fundamental. As
the precision of the private signals increases, traders collectively trade more aggressively against
any discrepancy between the observed price p and the fundamental . Formally, from Lemma 1
the total asset demand by informed traders in a pure demand-schedule market is given by:
Z
InM
x
i
( +  1=2x i   p)di = x
 Z
InM
 1i di
!
(   p) = x
InM
(   p);
which implies that B =  1InMx ! +1; and thus p ! , as x ! +1. In the limit p becomes
perfectly informative of  (i.e. z ! +1); this eventually causes every traders to choose ai based
exclusively on p (rather than xi) in the second stage and thereby facilitates coordination on a
self-fullling outcome. In contrast, in a pure market-order market ( = 0) informed traders do not
condition their trades on p and hence face a residual payo¤ risk even as the xis get more and more
informative of . This payo¤ risk leads market-order traders to trade less aggressively on the basis
of their private signal, which limits the amount of information that is aggregated into the price.
Formally, from Lemma 1 again the total asset demand by informed traders in a pure market-order
market is: Z
M

i
( +  1=2x i   )di = 
Z
M
 1i di

(   ) = 
M
(   );
In the limit as x ! +1 we have z = B2" < +1, i.e. the precision of the public signal
is bounded above. In this case private signals ultimately determine actions in the second stage of
the game, which hinders coordination on a self-fullling outcome.
3.2. Market with both types. We now consider the case where both M and InM have
positive measure. For expositional clarity we assume here that traders share the same preferences,
i.e., i =  > 0 8i 2 [0; 1], but the result can straightforwardly be extended to the case of
heterogenous s. We rst note that for all  2 [0; 1] it is necessarily the case that 0 < B  x=,
with B = x= when  = 1 and B < x= when  < 1.6 Moreover, the uniqueness condition (9)
implies that, for (x; "; ) given, the uniqueness region expands as B falls. Thus, if for a given
set of parameters we are in the uniqueness region when  = 1 (i.e., the pure demand-schedule case),
then we are also in the uniqueness region when  < 1 (and both types coexist). Total di¤erencing
(8) and using the fact that 0 < B  x=, we nd that, for any (x; "; ) given and for all
 2 [0; 1] we have
@B
@
=
x   
 + 2(1  )B" ( +B2") 2 2
> 0:
In short, the greater the fraction of market-order traders, the larger the uniqueness region.
Again, this is because market order traders face price risk and hence trade less aggressively on
their private information than demand-schedule traders do. This reduces the amount of private
information that is aggregated into p, thereby reducing its weight in tradersassessment of  and
impeding traderscoordination.7
6Since  +B2"  , we have  1x +  1  
 
 +B
2"
 1  2x and hence B  x=.
7Note the total e¤ect of  on B aggregates two e¤ects. First, as  increases, traders on average trade more
aggressively and hence prices become more informative. Second, the aggressiveness of demand-schedule traders
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Figure 2: Multiplicity and uniqueness regions under exogenous order types. Note: p   1=2z and
x   1=2x denote the noise in the public and private signals, respectively. The bold line is the
uniqueness frontier, while the dotted lines shows how p depends on x for di¤erent values of :
The role of  in a¤ecting the multiplicity region is illustrated in Figure 2. From the analysis in
Section 2.2 we know that z = B2". Total di¤erencing equation (8), we nd that for @B=@x > 0,
implying that a greater precision of the private signal tends to raise z. The dotted and dashed
lines shows the monotone response of p   1=2z (i.e., the noise in the public price signal) to
changes in x = 
 1=2
x (i.e., the noise in the price signal) for di¤erent values of . The bold line
represents the multiplicity versus uniqueness boundary (3), i.e. the
p
2 2x =  2z +  line. A
smaller value of  is associated with a smaller uniqueness region as x ! 0.
4. Endogenous trader types
The analysis above shows that the presence of market-order traders tends to reduce the indeter-
minacy region by limiting the impact of the price signal on ex post beliefs about the fundamental.
We now analyse a traders choice of order type, and solve for the equilibrium shares of demand-
schedule and market-order traders. Essentially, the key tradeo¤ faced by every informed trader
is as follows. On the one hand, placing a demand schedule insulates the expected net payo¤ of a
trader from price risk (since e¤ective trades are conditional on the price). On the other hand, it is
more costly than a market order, as it requires to place a large (in fact, innite) number of limit
orders in order to generate a complete conditionality of the quantity traded on the execution price.
Following Vives (2008), we capture this tradeo¤ by normalising the cost of a market order to zero
and setting that of a full demand schedule to c > 0. We work out the solution to this problem
under the maintained assumption that the choice of order type must be made before the traders
tends to increase the price risk faced by market-order traders, thereby pushing them to trade less aggressively on
their private information as  increases. The direct e¤ect always dominate, implying that @B=@ > 0.
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Figure 3: Multiplicity and uniqueness regions under endogenous order types. Note: p   1=2z
and x   1=2x denote the noise in the public and private signals, respectively. The bold line is
the uniqueness frontier, while the dotted lines shows how p depends on x for di¤erent values of
c (the relative cost of demand schedules), taking into acount the endogenous adjustment of .
observe their private signal and place their orderssee Figure 1 again.8
We rank informed traders in nondecreasing order of risk aversion, dene the nondecreasing
function  : [0; 1] ! R+, and further assume that  (:) is an increasing homeomorphism and that
 (0) > 0. We solve for traderschoice of order backwards. First, we compute the expected utility
of a trader of each type conditional on its information set (i.e. (xi; p) 8i 2 InM , and xi 8i 2 M).
Second, we compute the unconditional ex ante utility of each type; and third, we compare the two
ex ante utilities for a given risk aversion coe¢ cient.
We know from the CARA-Normal framework that the value function associated with the in-
formation set Gi is:
W (Gi; i)  max
k
E[V (wi   c)jGi; i] =   exp

 E[   pjGi]
2
2V[   pjGi] + ci

;
where  = 1 if Gi = (xi; p) (i.e., the trader places a full demand schedule) or  = 0 if Gi = xi (i.e.,
the trader places a market order). Using the conditional distributions of  and    p for demand-
schedule and market-order traders (see equations (A1)(A2) in the Appendix A for details), we
8This follows Medrano (1996) and Brown and Zhang (1997). If it were not the case, traders could potentially be
willing to adjust their trades (both in terms of order type and amount of trades) depending on the observed shares
of demand-schedule and market-order traders, and this would make the signal extraction problem intractable.
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nd the corresponding value functions to be:
WInM (xi; p; i) =   exp

 C
2
(xi   p)2

; C  
2
x
x +  +B2"
; (10)
WM (xi; i) =   exp

 D
2
(xi   )2

; D  2

(1  B)2
x + 
+
2
"

; (11)
where  and B are dened in Lemma 1. Let f (x) denote the ex ante (i.e., unconditional) density
of the signal x. From the distributions of  and  we have x  N  ;  1 +  1x . Hence, using
(11) and rearranging the ex ante utility from being a market-order trader is found to be
E [WM (xi; i)] =
Z
R
WM (xi; i) f (xi)dxi =  
vuut 2+x +B2"
 +B2"
: (12)
The ex ante utility of demand-schedule traders is computed in a similar way, except that
we must rst condition their information set (xi; p) on xi before computing the unconditional
expectation ofWInM (xi; p; i).9 Applying the law of iterated expectations and rearranging we get:
E

E

WInM (xi; i)
xi = Z
R
E

WInM (xi; i)
xi f (xi)dxi
=  ec(i)
s
 +B2"
 +B2" + x
(13)
Trader i chooses chooses to place a full demand schedule if and only if E

E

WInM (xi; i)
xi 
E [WM (xi; i)], i.e., if and only if
 (i)   = 1
c
ln
0BB@
r
2
+x
+B2"

( +B2" + x)
 +B2"
1CCA ; (14)
where, from Lemma 1,
B = x
Z  1()
0
 (i) 1 di+

1
x
+
1

  1
 + "B2
 1 Z 1
 1()
 (i) 1 di; (15)
with  1 () = 0 if  <  (0) and  1 () = 1 if  >  (1). For (x; ; ") 2 R3+ given, the
properties of the  (:) function imply that the solution (;B) to (14)(15), if it exists, can be of
three types. More specically, it is either such that  2 [ (0) ;  (1)], in which case the solution
is interior (i.e., both M and InM are nonempty); or  <  (0), so that the solution is corner and
all traders placing market orders (i.e., (M; InM) = (I;?)); or  >  (1) and all traders place
9Here the intermediate step is the computation of E [WL (xi; p; i)jxi]. Using the price function (7) and the fact
that jxi  N

xxi+
x+
; 1
x+

we nd that
WL (xi; p; i) jxi  N
0@ x[x(1  B) + ](xi   )p
2(x +  +B2")(x + )
;
0@x
q
(B)2(x + ) 1 + 2 1"p
2(x +  +B2")
1A1A2 :
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full demand schedules (i.e., (M; InM) = (?; I)). The intuition for this sorting of informed traders
according to their degree of risk aversion is that a greater risk aversion lowers trading aggressiveness,
and hence the expected benet from expanding the information set from xi to (xi; p).10
As before we are interested in the outcome of the coordination stage of the game as x becomes
large (holding (; "; c) xed), especially with regard to the way market-order traders alter the
size of the uniqueness region. This is summarised in the proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. For any (; "; c) 2 R3+, and as x ! +1, (i) both M and InM have strictly
positive measure (i.e., the equilibrium is interior); (ii)  !  (0) (i.e., market-order traders even-
tually overwhelm the market); (iii) z 
x!1
(e2(0)c   1) 1x, so that z goes to innity as the
same rate x (while it does at the same rate as 2x when InM has exogenous, positive measure).
Proposition 2 emphasises several key properties of the equilibrium when x is large. Note that
the property that the equilibrium is interior as x ! +1 (point (ii)) is valid for any value of the
cost c; in contrast, when x is small one can easily construct examples of corner solutions with a
pure market-order (demand-schedule) market when c is su¢ ciently high (low). Points (ii) and (iii)
are closely related. As discussed in Section 3, market-order traders tend to slow down information
aggregation. It is precisely because they crowd out demand-schedule traders as x ! +1 (point
(ii)) that the precision of the endogenous public signal grows at the same rate as x, instead of
2x when market shares are exogenous (point (iii)). To see how this may expand the uniqueness
region, note that under exogenous shares from (8) we have z 
x!1
(=InM )2x. Hence for
 > 0 and x large enough, since

(e2(0)c   1) 1x

=(=InM )2x !x!1 0 it is necessarily the case
that the precision of the price signal is greater under endogenous orders than under exogenous
orders. Hence, whenever the uniqueness condition (3) is satised under exogenous shares, it is
also so under endogenous shares, but the converse is not true. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship
between z and x when x is large (i.e., x = 
 1=2
x is small) and the shares of market-order and
demand-schedules traders are endogenous.
Finally, note from (13) that heterogeneity in the cost c is formally equivalent to heterogeneity
in risk aversion. To encompass both cases, rank traders in nondecreasing orders of c (i)  (i),
assume that the function g (i) = c (i)  (i) is continuous, strictly increasing, that its reciprocal is
continuous, and that 0 < g (0) < g (1) < +1, and solve for the marginal trader exactly in the
same way as in the case where c (i) = c 8i 2 I.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed a two-stage global game wherein a market-based asset price de-
termined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal a¤ecting traders
decisions in the coordination stage of the game. By allowing both market-order and demand-
schedule traders to coexist, and by letting traders choose their preferred order type, the market
microstructure considered here is both richer and more realistic than the usual pure demand sched-
ule/Walrasian auctioneer paradigm. As we have shown, in this context the multiplicity region can
be small even when private information is very precise and especially so when traders optimise
over their type of order (in addition to their amount of trade). The reason for this is that the
10See Medrano (1996) and Vives (2008) for further discussion.
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presence of market-order traders limits information aggregation and hence the precision of the
endogenous public signal that may serve as a coordination device when deciding whether or not to
attack the regime. In this sense, a lower degree of informational e¢ ciency (in the trading stage)
may ultimately be stabilising (in the coordination stage). While this conclusion was derived under
a specic barrier to full informational e¢ ciency market-order traderswillingness to avoid price
risk, we conjecture that it would also apply in a variety of contexts where information aggregation
is impeded.11
6. Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1 We restrict our attention to equilibrium price functions p(; ") that are
linear in (; "), which implies that p is normally distributed. A trader i with risk aversion coe¢ cient
i and information set Gi has a demand for assets ki(Gi) = 
 1
i E[   pjGi]=V[   pjGi]. We may
thus write the demands by limit- and market-order traders as follows:
8i 2 InM; kiInM (xi; p) =  1i fInM (xi; p), with fInM (xi; p) =
E[jxi; p]  p
V[jxi; p] ;
8i 2 M; kiM (xi) =  1i fM (xi), with fM (xi) =
E[   pjxi]
V[   pjxi] ;
i.e., within each group asset demands are identical up to a risk tolerance correction  1i . Now
conjecture that fInM (:) and fM (:) have the form fInM (xi; p) = a(xi   ) + (p) and fM (xi) =
c(xi   ), where a and b are normalised trading intensities (for a trader with i = 1) and  (:)
is linear. Using the convention that the average signal equals  a.s., and recalling that i is
independent from i, the limit order book is given by
L(p) =
Z
InM
kiInM (xi; p)di+
Z
M
kiM (xi)di+ " = B

 +B 1"
 B + (p) Z
InM
 1i di;
where B = a=InM + c (1  ) =M . The market making sector observes L(:); a linear function of
p; and sets p = E[jL(:)] = E[jz], where z = +B 1" is the public signal. From standard normal
theory we infer that p is indeed linear, normal and given by equation (7).
We now need to identify a and c. From the joint distribution of (p; xi; ) we get:
8i 2 InM;
(
E[jp; xi] = B2"z++xxiB2"++x =
(B2"+)p+xxi
B2"++x
;
V[jp; xi] = (B2" +  + x) 1:
(A1)
8i 2 M;
(
E[   pjxi] = (1 B)xx+ (xi   );
V[   pjxi] = (1  B)2 V[jxi] + 2" =
(1 B)2
x+
+ 
2
"
:
(A2)
Hence, we obtain
kiInM (xi; p; i) =
E[jp; xi]  p
iV[jp; xi]
=
x
i
(xi   p); kiM (xi; i) =
E[   pjxi]
iV[   pjxi]
=

i
 
xi   

;
where  = ( 1x + 
 1
  
 
 +B
2"
 1
) 1. In the special case where i =  8i 2 [0; 1], we have
11For example, inasmuch as impefect competition in the asset market slows down information revelation (Kyle,
1989), we expect it to also expand the uniqueness region in the coordination stage.
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kiInM (xi; p) = 
 1x (xi   p), kM (xi) =  1(xi   ) and p = (1   B) + Bz; where B solves
B =  1x + (1  ) 1 and  = B"B2"+ :
Let us now turn to the parameter B. To establish that B is unique, positive and nite, dene
the function f : R! R as follows:
f : B ! B   x
InM
  1  
M (
 1
x + 
 1
   ( +B2") 1)
;
so that a root of f (B) is a solution to (8). f is continuous and strictly increasing over [0;+1) and
such that f (0) =  x


InM
+ (1 )M

< 0 and lim
B!+1
f (B) = +1. Hence f is a bijection that
admits a unique root B0 > 0 over [0;+1). Moreover, as B !  1x +  1  
 
 +B
2"
 1
> 0
on R; f (:) is strictly negative on R : Hence B0 is the unique root of f in R. In the numerical
implementation of the model we use the exact solution for B, which is found using Cardanos
method and gives:
B =
3
s
1
2
( (2a
3
2
27
  a1a2
3
+ a0) +
r
4a31 + 4a0a
3
2   (a1a2)2
27
  2
3
a0a1a2 + a20)
+
3
s
1
2
( (2a
3
2
27
  a1a2
3
+ a0) 
r
4a31 + 4a0a
3
2   (a1a2)2
27
  2
3
a0a1a2 + a20) 
a2
3
;
where
a0 =   
( 1x +  1 )"
 

InM
+
(1  )
M
!
; a1 =
 1x 
( 1x +  1 )"
;
and a2 =  
[ InM
+ (1 )M +

InM
x
 1
 ]
( 1x +  1 )
:
B. Proof of Proposition 1 We know from Lemma 1 that B 2 R+ uniquely solves (8). When
 = 0, B solves 1=(Mx) = 
 1
x + 
 1
  
 
 + "x
2
 1. In this case limx!+1B is nite, hence
the uniqueness condition (9) necessarily holds as x ! +1. In contrast, when  = 1 we have
limx!+1
B2p
x
= +1, hence the uniqueness condition (9) is necessarily violated as x ! +1.
C. Proof of Proposition 2 (i) We show that k   1 () 2]0; 1[ for x su¢ ciently high, and
that k is unique. Let us rst dene the function
~f : x; k ! e2(k)c  

1  
x + 
x
B(k; x)2" + 

1 +
x
B(k; x)2" + 

; (C.1)
where B(k; x) is the unique solution to
B(k; x) = x
Z k
0
(i) 1di+

1
x
+
1

  1
 +B(k; x)2"
 1 Z 1
k
(i) 1di: (C.2)
We have ~f (x; 1) !
x!1
e2(1)c 1 > 0 while ~f (x; 0) !
x!1
 1 < 0. Hence, by the intermediate
value theorem there exists  2 R+;such that for all x  ; 0 2] ~f (x; 0) ; ~f (x; 1) [. By continuity,
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8x  ; 9k (x) 2]0; 1[ such that ~f (x; k (x)) = 0. In this range of parameter, there exists an
interior equilibrium allocation, and the corner solutions are ruled out (otherwise the polar traders
would be better o¤ switching positions).
To establish uniqueness, dene ~  = (x + ) and X  x=
 
B(k(x); x)
2" + 

, and
rewrite ~f (x; k (x)) = 0 as P (X) = ~X2   (1   ~)X+e2(k(x))c   1 = 0. This polynomial has
the following two real roots:
s ; s+ =
1
2~

(1  ~)
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(k(x))c   1 :
We prove by contradiction that X = s  is the only possible root of P (X) = 0 when x becomes
large enough. Formally,
91  ;8x 2 R+; 8k 2]0; 1[;
x  1
~f (x; k) = 0
)
) x
B(k; x)2" + 
= s : (C.3)
To see this, suppose that 81  ;9x 2 R+; 9k 2]0; 1[ such that
 
x  1
 ^ ( ~f (x; k (x)) = 0) ^  x
B(k(x); x)2" + 
= s+

:
In particular, for n 2 N large enough (say larger than n0 = de),
9x; 9k; (x  n) ^ ( ~f (x; k) = 0) ^ (x=
 
B(k; x)
2" + 

= s+)
For every n  n0 we pick an x, and an associated k(x), satisfying (x  n)^( ~f (x; k (x)) =
0) ^ (x=
 
B(k(x); x)
2" + 

) and denote it n (resp. k(n)), thereby constructing the series
(n)nn0 (resp. (k(n))nn0). As n !n!11, and since k(n) must belong to [0; 1] we have
4~
(1  ~)2

e2(k(n))c   1

=
4
n + 

n + 
n
2 
e2(k(n))c   1

!
n!1 0; (C.4)
and hence
X ~
1  ~ =
1
2
"
1 +
s
1  4~
(1  ~)2
 
e2(k(n))c   1# !
n!1 1:
This in turn implies that
n
B(k(n); n)2" + 

n!1
n

;
that is, B(k(n); n)2" !
n!1 0. Since for each n  n0, B(k(n); n)
2  B(0; n)2 while 
B(0; n)
2

n2N admits a nite, non-zero limit as n ! 1, we have a contradiction that proves
(C.3). To summarise, for every given set of parameters, the function
k ! x
B(k; x)2" + 
  1
2

(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4  e2(k)c   1 (C.4)
is strictly decreasing and thus has a unique root. For every x  1, we also have that x  ;
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hence we know that there exists k 2]0; 1[ such that ~f(x; k) = 0: Moreover, as x  1, we know
that k is the unique root of (C.4). Hence, k 2]0; 1[ exists and is unique. We will denote it k(x):
(ii) From above, 8x  1 we have x=
 
B(k(x); x)
2" + 

= s . Since k(x) 2]0; 1[ we
have
x
B(k(x); x)2" + 

(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(0)c   1
2~
;
or, rearranging,
B(k(x); x)
2  2~
(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(0)c   1 x" :
Moreover, from (15) we know that

k (x)
 (1)
x
2
 2x
 Z k(x)
0
(i) 1di
!2
 B(k(x); x)2
Hence, 8x  1;
0  k (x)   (1)
x
vuutx
"
2~
(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(0)c   1
We know from (C.4) that 4~
(1 ~)2
 
e2(0)c   1 !
x!1
0. It follows that
(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(0)c   1
2~
=
(1  ~)  (1  ~)
q
1  4~
(1 ~)2
 
e2(0)c   1
2
=
(1  ~)
4~
4~
(1  ~)2

e2(0)c   1

+ o
x!1
(1) =
e2(0)c   1
1  ~ + ox!1(1) !x!1 e
2(0)c   1;
We infer that
 (1)
x
vuutx
"
2~
(1  ~) 
q
(1  ~)2   4~  e2(0)c   1 x!1 x
s
x="
e2(0)c   1 !x!1 0;
Hence k(x) !
x!1
0, and (by the continuity of  (:))  =  (k(x)) !
x!1
 (0).
(iii) Using (C.3) above we get
x
B(k(x); x)2" + 
= s  =
e2(k(x))c   1
1  ~ + ox!1
 
e2(k(x))c   1
1  ~
!
!
x!1
e2(0)c   1:
We infer that
B(k(x); x)
2"
x
=
B(k(x); x)
2" + 
x
  
x
!
x!1
1
e2(0)c   1
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We conclude that z = B(k(x); x)2" 
x!1
(e2(0)c   1) 1x.
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